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Abstract: The relation between quantum measurement and thermodynam-
ically irreversible processes is investigated. The reduction of the state vec-
tor is fundamentally asymmetric in time and shows an observer-relatedness
which may explain the double interpretation of the state vector as a represen-
tation of physical states as well as of information about them. The concept
of relevance being used in all statistical theories of irreversible thermody-
namics is shown to be based on the same observer-relatedness. Quantum
theories of irreversible processes implicitly use an objectivized process of
state vector reduction. The conditions for the reduction are discussed, and
I speculate that the final (subjective) observer system might even be carried
by a spacetime point.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Several contributions concerned with the problem of measurement in quan-
tum theory suggested a close relationship between the measurement process
and irreversible processes in statistical physics [1-4]. In fact, there are very
plausible arguments supporting this idea: quantum measurements seem to
require irreversible thermodynamics for the amplification of microscopic phe-
nomena, while the consistency problems between deterministic1 equations of
motion and master equations on the one hand, and between the Schro¨dinger
equation and the statistical character of quantum measurement on the other,
appear analogous in some respect. Moreover, the ensemble (incomplete in-
formation) concept of statistical physics and the popular interpretation of
the wave function as representing information about physical systems both
contain a similar observer-relatedness. (In contrast, the time asymmetry
connected with CP violation is described by a unitary time evolution, and
does not show any relation to the two other time-asymmetric phenomena.)
Although the formal parts of the above-cited investigations are essen-
tially clear, there are deep differences concerning their interpretation. There
are claims that these contributions serve to derive the statistical nature of
quantum measurements from thermodynamical fluctuations, while in gen-
eral the statistical nature of quantum theory is regarded as specific and
fundamental.
Quite obviously, these discrepancies are based on different positions con-
cerning the basic concepts of quantum theory. It is generally accepted that
this theory makes statistical predictions: it describes ensembles of final
states appearing in a measurement process. This statement remains in-
complete as long as the conceptual terms to describe the members of these
ensembles are not defined. That is, the kinematical concepts (particle posi-
tions, wave functions, or something else) to be used to describe the physical
state of the apparatus after a measurement (its ”pointer position” or mea-
surement result) have to be chosen, and the same choice is required for the
time before and during measurements in order to formulate a dynamical
theory of measurement. A specific question is whether classical concepts
are fundamentally required to describe the measurement results, or whether
they are no more than a short-hand descriptions for certain quantum me-
chanical state vectors (“derived classical concepts”). For example, the spot
1The term “deterministic” is here used to characterize dynamical laws possessing
unique solutions, although some of the founders of quantum theory interpreted this term
(and correspondingly its apparent opposite: the quantum mechanical “indeterminacy”)
as the possibility of (in principle) completely determining the required initial conditions.
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resulting on a photographic plate in the measurement of a photon position
can be described by a stable, localized change in the corresponding molecular
wave functions, while the “classical” position of a pointer may be replaced
by the sufficiently localized center-of-mass part of the many-particle wave
function for the pointer. The probability interpretation of quantum theory
then has to be expressed by means of a collapse (or reduction) of the state
vector.
In order to avoid conceptual confusion, some basic interpretational issues
of quantum theory are recalled in Section 2, before one of them is chosen for
the further discussion. In Section 3, some fundamentals of statistical physics
are discussed, and the role of observer-related concepts, such as relevance
and information, is pointed out. Their relation to the quantum measurement
process is studied in Section 4. Speculations about a possible solution of the
measurement problem are presented in Section 5.
2. CONCEPTUAL AND DYNAMICAL DUALISM
According to Niels Bohr’s epistemology, quantum mechanics is incompatible
with the existence of a real microscopic world. It is meaningless to ask
whether an electron “really” is a particle or a wave – each choice would
lead to false conclusions. Instead, the wave function is assumed to be a tool
for calculating probabilities for potential results of measurements (“pointer
positions” of a macroscopic device). These have to be described by classical
concepts, which, however, are subject to the uncertainty relations. During a
measurement, the electron may “assume” a definite position or momentum
(that is, a classical property). On the other hand, quantum mechanics
is assumed to be universally valid. This would mean that the apparatus
itself must possess a quantum mechanical state vector (non-relativistically
represented by a many-particle wave function).
It seems that by “reality” (to be rejected for the microscopic world)
Bohr meant the existence of general and consistently applicable concepts
to describe states of physical objects. His “conceptual dualism” between
classical and quantum concepts goes beyond the dualism characterized by
conjugate variables, such as position and momentum, or particle number
and field.
According to another interpretation – I shall call it von Neumann’s –
the state vector is regarded as generally and exclusively applicable if in ad-
dition to the Schro¨dinger equation another dynamical law (its “collapse” or
“reduction”) is assumed to apply. This collapse describes an unpredictable
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transition of a general state vector into one of its components of a certain
representation, ∑
l
clψl → ψl . (1)
This existence of two different dynamical laws may be called a “dynamical
dualism”. The reduction is indeterministic: the state vector allows us to
predict only an ensemble of potential state vectors at later times. In this way,
the state vector itself represents an objective physical state, but it contains
only incomplete information about the future (or past!) state. There are
only intuitive rules to decide which one of the two dynamical laws to use in
a certain situation. By definition, the reduction applies in “measurement-
like” situations, where the final states are eigenstates of phenomenologically
chosen observables.2
The reduction (that is, the dynamical dualism) has to be used also in
Bohr’s interpretation, in particular if a measurement serves to prepare initial
states for a second one. Intuitive rules are then again required to switch
between classical variables and quantum mechanical state vectors.
Both interpretations appear useful pragmatically. Von Neumann’s in-
terpretation may be preferable for fundamental discussions, since it is at
least conceptually unambiguous. It does not presume any classical con-
cepts, except for constructing the specific state space of a quantum system
whose classical description is known beforehand. For example, an individual
droplet in a Wilson chamber would not be described simply by its classical
position, but instead by a localized wave packet for the center of mass of
an aggregate of molecules. Moreover, it seems to be possible to decide on
purely dynamical grounds [5] which properties behave classically under spec-
ified circumstances. For example, particle aspects are preferred for charged
fermions under “normal” conditions, but wave aspects for most electromag-
netic phenomena or for other bosons under conditions of superfluidity. In
general, the quantum state of a certain space region (which may include
the apparatus and/or the observer) may according to quantum field theory
not only be found in classical field configurations, but also in superpositions
thereof.
A state vector (such as represented by a many-particle wave function)
is usually rejected as describing an individual physical state, since it is a
2So-called measurements of the second kind, for which the collapse component ψl does
not correspond to the eigenstate of the measured quantity, can be reduced to measurements
of the first kind by enlarging the considered system appropriately (for example, to include
the measurement apparatus): the “pointer” always remains in its observed state directly
after being read.
4
nonlocal concept [6]. This nonlocality of quantum theory has well known
consequences [7,8], and it is a direct consequence of the superposition prin-
ciple. It is compatible with the dynamical locality presumed in field theo-
ries or used in non-relativistic many-particle wave mechanics with contact
interactions. The kinematical nonlocality is at the heart of the EPR prob-
lem [9,10], while its consequences have recently been experimentally verified
over macroscopic distances [11] by using Bell’s inequality [12]. Bell’s anal-
ysis has clearly revealed that any realistic theory (for example in the sense
of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [9]) which is experimentally equivalent to
quantum theory must necessarily be nonlocal. This could only be avoided
if the hidden variables behaved in a thermodynamically unusual way (con-
spiratorially or teleologically, that is, according to special final conditions).
Disregarding this latter possibility, there is thus no good reason to reject
the state vector as representing reality.
Since the state vector is a nonlocal concept, it cannot generally be applied
to local systems. (A local system may be defined by means of a time-like
world tube in four-dimensional spacetime.) For dynamical reasons, no state
vector can ever be consistently applied to a macroscopic system, except for
the universe as a whole [13,14], and only under special circumstances does it
even apply to a microscopic system. Hence, the reduction cannot be ascribed
to perturbations caused by the observer or the environment, since the state
vector used in Eq. (1) must be assumed to represent the whole universe,
thus already including all possible perturbations.
The dynamical dualism may be avoided in the interpretation of quantum
theory proposed by Everett [15]. The existence of many unobserved world
components – postulated in this interpretation – is usually regarded as an
unnecessary and extravagant complication. The assumption of “other” com-
ponents (which would disappear according to the reduction) is in fact as un-
necessary, but also as natural, as the assumption of the existence of objects
while not being observed: it follows from an extrapolation of the empirical
laws of nature (in Everett’s case the Schro¨dinger equation). However, the
description of our observed universe in derived classical terms corresponds to
the reduced states, wherein classical properties appear as wave packets that
are approximate eigenstates of the phenomenological observables. Therefore,
von Neumann’s interpretation will be preferred to Everett’s in what follows,
except where explicitly stated. As will be discussed in Section 5, Everett’s
“branching” is based on a similar observer-relatedness as von Neumann’s
reduction.
The problem of quantum measurement thus concerns the dynamics of the
state vector during a measurement (the reduction). Bohr’s interpretation of
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the wave function would not even offer concepts for a non-phenomenological
description of measurements. It refers to an outside observer – in conflict
with quantum nonlocality [14]. The ensemble of potential collapsed state
vectors (formally represented by a density matrix lacking the initial inter-
ference terms) can evolve from the original state vector only by means of an
indeterministic law. Just one member of this ensemble – the observed one
– may then be considered as “real” (although this is a matter of definition,
as can be seen from Everett’s interpretation). In contrast, the ensemble
describing all potential results characterizes the incomplete predictability
according to this indeterminism. The remaining questions then are: (a)
When precisely does the reduction apply instead of the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion? (b) Which interference terms disappear in a certain situation, i.e., into
which components does the total state vector collapse (or, equivalently, how
to justify the phenomenological observable)?
3. THE CONCEPT OF RELEVANCE
IN STATISTICAL PHYSICS
Statistical theories of irreversible thermodynamics are fundamentally based
on a concept of “relevance” (generalized coarse-graining) and certain initial
(rather than final) conditions. The latter may be special for the relevant vari-
ables, but random with respect to the irrelevant ones. Statistical methods
may then be used to derive master equations which approximately describe
the dynamics of the relevant quantities. The latter are often regarded as
macroscopic, and will be shown to be related to the classical concepts in
quantum theory. Master equations are able to describe the arrow of time
experienced by us as causality and an apparently “fixed past”. Since this is
usually regarded as the reason why initial conditions may be “given”, this
argument may appear circular from a fundamental point of view.
Master equations are based on various appropriately chosen definitions
of relevance. Examples of quantities considered as irrelevant are particle
correlations in Boltzmann’s H-theorem, fine-grained phase-space positions
in Gibbs’ ink drop analogy, or certain phase relations in quantum theories
of irreversible processes. Zwanzig [16] formalized the general concept of
relevance by means of projection operators P in the space of phase-space
densities ρ(p, q) (in classical mechanics) or density matrices ρmn (in quan-
tum mechanics). He derived a general dynamical description (pre-master
equation) of the projected densities ρrel = Pρ by methods which had been
developed for special projections by van Hove [17] and Prigogine [18], and
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he demonstrated that most examples studied by the great pioneers of statis-
tical physics could be formulated in terms of the projection method. It was
conceptually only of secondary importance that Zwanzig’s procedure turned
out to be too general on the one hand (since not all projections of density
matrices are density matrices again) and too limited on the other (as many
important examples of relevance have to be described by nonlinear idempo-
tent operators [19,20]. In the following, the term “Zwanzig projection” is
used for all appropriate idempotent operations.
The concept of relevance introduces an observer-related element. This
appears incompatible with our general understanding that the laws of ther-
modynamics are objective. The Zwanzig projection is able to map pure
(“real”) states into (“representative”) ensembles. The latter seem to cor-
respond to the observer-related concept of incomplete information, where
entropy appears as a measure of lacking information. In contrast to in-
formation theory, some objectivization is obtained in statistical physics by
calculating the entropy not from the actual information, but by assuming
that the relevant (or “easily accessible”) quantities are always known, while
the irrelevant ones are never known and equally distributed with respect to
a certain measure. For example, long-range order parameters always appear
easily accessible; this may explain the relation between entropy and disorder.
Nevertheless, the concept of relevance is fundamentally subjective. From an
objective point of view there is no reason why the position of an individual
molecule should be irrelevant, and even for practical applications may the
value of entropy depend upon whether one decides to consider fluctuations
or not. Although relevance also depends on objective properties – a quan-
tity must be regarded as relevant if it can easily influence other relevant
quantities –, there is a conceptual chain of relevant quantities that can only
end with the (potential) observer. It must be expected that at the end of
this chain (in the observer’s brain) microscopic properties are relevant again.
Objective criteria by themselves, such as dynamical stability, are certainly
not sufficient, as is demonstrated by the general (even classically nonlocal)
constants of motion, which are quite irrelevant in the sense of statistical
mechanics.
Because of the dynamical coupling between relevant and irrelevant quan-
tities, described by Zwanzig’s reversible and still exact pre-master equation
iρrel(t) = PLρrel(t) + PL e
[−i(1−P )Lt]ρirr(0)
−i
∫
dτPL e[−i(1−P )Lτ ](1− P )Lρrel(t− τ) , (2)
where L is the Liouville operator, Lρ = [H, ρ], entropy as a measure of the
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(by definition missing) irrelevant information need not be constant in time
under deterministic equations of motion. Total entropy may be defined as3
S := −k tr(ρrel ln ρrel) = −k
∫
dαwα lnwα +
∫
dawαSα , (3)
where α denotes the values of the relevant quantities, while wα = tr(Pαρ),
and Pα is the projector onto the subspace corresponding to α. The first
term on the RHS describes the entropy of any lacking relevant information,
while the second one averages accordingly over the “physical” (objectivized)
entropies Sα := −ktr(ρα ln ρα) as a function of α, where ρα := Pα/trPα
is independent of the “subjective” ρ. However, there is no reason for a
monotonic increase of entropy without an appropriate assumption about
initial conditions. Thereafter, it is a very plausible consequence of the large
number of degrees of freedom (although hard to prove in general, because of
the existence of singular counterexamples) that the entropy of closed systems
will in practice never decrease any more. Furthermore, in many cases the
feedback from irrelevant information into relevant one may completely or
partially be neglected because of the large information capacity defined by
the irrelevant degrees of freedom (related to their enormous Poincare´ cycles).
This leads to the justification of general master equations in the form
ρ˙rel(t) = −PL
∫
∞
0
dτ e[−i(1−P )Lτ ](1− P )Lρrel(t) . (4)
They describe the effective dynamics of the relevant degrees of freedom for
states in accordance with the special initial conditions. Master equations
are equivalent to an alternating application (in the “forward” direction of
time) of deterministic dynamics and Zwanzig projections [22], whereby the
latter are responsible for the increase of entropy.
The remaining fundamental problem is to understand the origin of the
special initial conditions. By applying statistical arguments to them, one
would expect the relevant quantities always – even initially – to be close to
their equilibrium values. The special conditions cannot simply be explained
as being due to the preparation, because the process of preparation is just an
example of interacting physical systems; the preparator himself is prepared
by his environment. The initial conditions thus have to be considered as of
cosmological origin. This demonstrates how the concepts of relevance are
extrapolated beyond the subject’s existence after having been objectivized.
It is certainly a nontrivial fact that the universe is special in its initial
3See Ref. 21 for formal properties resulting for various definitions of entropy.
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conditions, and therefore asymmetric in time, and it appears difficult to
justify a concept of relevance in purely objective terms. However, it would
be most remarkable if the world were asymmetric in terms of precisely those
variables that are relevant to an observer who later evolves as an effect of
these special initial conditions.
Zwanzig’s method of describing the dynamics of relevant properties un-
der the assumption of special initial conditions seems to be completely anal-
ogous for classical and quantum physics. However, this is only true for the
formalism – not for its interpretation.
The classical probability density ρ(p, q) uniquely describes an ensemble
of states (points in phase space). One assumes, in this case, that one of these
points represents reality. The observer may then “pick out” a subensemble
by a non-disturbing observation (increase of his information). All previous
observations (his own and others’), which must also have reduced the initial
ensemble, have to be compatible with this final subensemble. Physically,
the observation means that the observer interacts with the system in such
a way that some of his variables change in dependence of the system’s vari-
ables which distinguish between these subensembles. The “sensitivity” of
the observer to these variables finally determines what is relevant. This ob-
servation process should be discussed in microscopic terms. In order to avoid
a subsequent reversal of this observation, an in practice irreversible process
of information storage (in the sense of very long Poincare´ cycles) must ac-
company the observation. In phenomenological terms one should expect the
observer system to serve as an entropy sink [23] in order to compensate for
the entropy decrease corresponding to the reduction of the ensemble.4 Clas-
sically, there is no limit for the capacity of such a sink, since the phase space
of continuous observer variables could be arbitrarily fine-grained, and their
initial entropy has no lower bound.
This actual information gain by an observer has to be distinguished from
a process which seems to describe a decrease in objectivized entropy. To il-
lustrate: if droplets condense out of an undercooled gas, their shape and po-
sition may be regarded as macroscopic (choice of a relevance concept), and
therefore as “given” – regardless of an actual observation process. The con-
densation into definite droplets thus seems to describe a decrease of physical
entropy, equivalent to the measure of information describing the positions
and shapes. However, if the transition from one droplet position into another
4BrilIouin [24] argued that this entropy decrease is compensated for by an entropy
increase in the communication medium (for example, light). This is in general true, but
one can in principle think of a direct interaction between system and observer.
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one – except for their collective continuous motion – is possible only through
evaporation and re-condensation, condensation would only then form an ir-
reversible process if the number of micro-states for each droplet position is
larger than the corresponding number of micro-states for the uncondensed
gas. The entropy increase during the condensation process into the ensem-
ble of unknown droplet positions must therefore at least compensate the
increase of information during a subsequent observation of the droplet po-
sition. A similarly rigorous argument cannot be found for Szillard’s process
of an actual-information gain, although accompanying processes will always
by far overcompensate it.
4. STATE VECTOR REDUCTION
IN QUANTUM STATISTICAL PHYSICS
In contrast to the classical probability density ρ(p, q), the quantum me-
chanical density matrix ρmn does not uniquely correspond to an ensemble
of states. Although it is often formally represented by the ensemble of or-
thogonal states φi which diagonalize it (in fact, the entropy is calculated
from this ensemble), the density matrix defines nonvanishing probabilities
also for components of these states. This is true because of the fundamental
probability postulate of quantum theory, which states that a state χ may be
found in another state φ (if 〈φ|χ〉 6= 0) in a measurement. Only because of
this postulate can different ensembles of not necessarily mutually orthogonal
states be equivalent and be represented by one and the same density matrix
[25].
For these reasons, the process of observation can quantum-mechanically
not be described in perfect analogy to the classical process of “picking out”.
It is true that an element of a given ensemble of wave functions {φi} could be
picked out by means of an interaction of φiΦ→ φiΦ
(i), where Φ describes the
observer. The observer state would then change in dependence on the state
of the observed system, and the observer becomes aware of the property i.
However, there are also observations of a superposition
∑
ciφi by means of
the same interaction. They are described by the dynamical process
∑
i
ciφiΦ0 →
∑
i
ciφiΦ
(i) → φiΦ
(i) . (5)
This process contains a reduction of the wave function as the second step.
The reduction changes the state vector – it does not merely describe the pick-
out of some pre-existing subensemble – yet it cannot be described by the
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Schro¨dinger equation [26]. This conclusion holds no matter how complicated
the system Φ, which contains the observer, may be.5
If one attempts, in analogy to the classical case, to introduce an objec-
tivized concept of relevance, and to define the entropy as a function of the
relevant quantities, one presumes that the latter are always given for the
real physical state. That is, one assumes that the corresponding reductions
always occur (without any measurement). Since this assumption excludes
conjugate measurements, it is equivalent to the introduction of superselec-
tion rules. Quantum mechanical master equations based on a relevance
concept (a Zwanzig projection) – for example, by introducing a restricted
set of observabIes corresponding to a reducible algebra [27] – therefore pre-
suppose the reduction process. This reduction is thus responsible for their
nonunitarity. It is then not surprising that the master equation can be used
(in a vicious circle) to “derive” the reduction, thus erroneously indicating
that an irreversible amplification of fluctuations in the classical sense is the
true cause of the indeterminacy of quantum measurements. (The micro-
scopic degrees of freedom of the apparatus can not be the hidden variables
which would determine the measurement outcome.)
This objectivization of the reduction beyond measurements proper illus-
trates the possibility (to be discussed further in Section 5) to assume that
the reduction in a measurement occurs as soon as the measured superpo-
sition has been amplified to the macroscopic scale. This seems to be the
reason why the objective existence of classical properties has become part
of our intuition. Conversely, this impossibility of in practice distinguishing
the superposition from an ensemble after a measurement leads to the conse-
quence that the reduction (or an Everett branching) can be confirmed only
by the final subjective observation – in close relationship to the application
of chains of relevance ending at the observer in classical statistical physics.
The relation between a reduction and subjective awareness – suspicious to
most physicists as investigators of an objective reality – appears to some
[28,29] as the most consistent interpretation, since (a) deviations from the
Schro¨dinger equation never had to be used except for measurement-like pro-
cesses, and (b) fundamentally new laws may be expected in connection with
5Since a macroscopic observer can never be kinematically isolated in quantum the-
ory [14], he has to be considered as an open system. Pragmatic theories of open systems
are phenomenological and approximate descriptions of their interactions with the environ-
ment, similar to master equations. In order to write down a non-phenomenological theory,
one has to make the “weak quantum cosmological assumption” that there is a state vector
for the universe such that Φ in (5) describes the “rest of the universe”, including the
observer.
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fundamentally new concepts, such as awareness, which transcends physics
but is obviously coupled to physics by physical processes of observation.
Our conventional concept of an evolving state of the universe in terms of
derived classical terms makes permanent use of the reduction as an indeter-
ministic and symmetry-violating process. The initial state of the universe
may have been completely symmetric; the reduction – no matter when and
where precisely it occurs – would create the complexity of the world by its
symmetry-breaking power [30].6 It forces “relevant” properties to assume
definite values by projecting the state vector onto their corresponding sub-
spaces. Although precise rules for the reduction have never been given, these
rules should confine and help to define the physical meaning of relevance.
The essential lesson of quantum theory is that the conventional (classical)
physical reality cannot be assumed to be independent of the fundamental
concepts of relevance and reduction.
5. THE PHYSICAL EVENT OF OBSERVATION
A phenomenon is “observed” when an observer becomes aware of it. This
requires the observed system to affect the ultimate observer system, which
is known to be localized in the brain and probably in the cerebral cortex.
This description is utterly nontrivial in quantum theory, since a state of
this system cannot even exist because of quantum nonlocality. The state
of awareness or consciousness can therefore not simply correspond (in the
sense of a naive psycho-physical parallelism) to “the” state of the observer
system. How can local awareness be related to drastically nonlocal physical
concepts?
The state of the final observer system (or at least its essential variables)
is relevant in an absolute (though subjective) sense. Objectivized concepts
of relevance and observation (for example, by an apparatus or the human
sensorium) are derived and of secondary nature for this purpose.
Although a quantum mechanical state vector is nonlocal, that is, not
in general defined in terms of any state vectors of its subsystems, quantum
theory is special among nonlocal theories. Potential state vectors for subsys-
tems are defined, while the general state of the total system can be expanded
in terms of direct products of them as a consequence of the superposition
principle.
Although the observer system is a subsystem of the universe, its relevant
6The expectation expressed in Ref. 30 that superpositions of different classical vacua
may not exist does not seem to be generally justified.
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properties must be “given” to the subjective observer whenever he is aware of
them. In quantum mechanical terms, this may be achieved by a reduction
of the state vector. Definite relevant properties of the ultimate observer
system are a minimum requirement for the mechanism of the reduction
(if there really is one to explain definite observations). While one may
assume that the derived and objectivized (classical) relevant properties, too,
assume definite values by means of the reduction [31,32], there can be no
reduction, in general, for microscopic properties (such as electron positions).
The borderline between quantum and classical description had repeatedly
to be shifted toward the observer – far beyond the microscopic realm –
whenever new experimental techniques allowed the observation of quantum
mechanical phase relations. This is well demonstrated by superconductivity
and other long-range phenomena of quantum coherence, but most rigorously
by the quantum nonlocality experiments [11].
These considerations tend to show that in quantum theory the reduction
(true or apparent) is responsible for the fact that relevant (and therefore also
classical) properties may be “given”. Reductions may irreversibly create
initial conditions – they don’t merely select them [25,30]. Anthropocentric
reasons may be required in addition [33] to explain the special conditions
describing “our” universe, that is, our special world branch that has resulted
from all those reductions which must have occurred in the past.
Is it possible to further constrain the mechanism of the reduction? A
speculative proposal will now be presented. If there does exist a psycho-
physical coupling, it should be formulated in most fundamental physical
terms. Therefore, it should use strictly quantum mechanical concepts and
remain compatible with the principles of relativity. This novel parallelism
(based on reduced state vectors or, alternatively, Everett’s “relative states”)
seems to form the main difference between classical and quantum theories.
The physical counterpart of consciousness appears to be local. Let this
local system be represented in terms of an orthonormal basis of states φi.
If ψk is a basis of states for the rest of the universe, a general global state
can be written as
∑
ik φiψk. According to the minimum requirement for the
reduction mentioned above, the reduced state after observing a result l, say,
would be a product state, φˆlψˆl, if φ describes only the ultimately relevant
degrees of freedom. Quite generally, the reduction is asymmetric in time,
since it (indeterministically) transforms an entangled state at time t− ǫ into
a product state at t + ǫ. If entropy is defined to be additive (an extensive
quantity) by choosing a local concept of objectivized relevance, the reduction
lowers this entropy. A general theory for the mechanism of the reduction
would have to explain or define (a) the observer system, (b) the basis of
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states φˆl, and (c) the time for the occurrence of a reduction (if any).
We know that the space of states possesses an inner product, and that
the different states ψˆl, observed in a certain measurement, are mutually
orthogonal with respect to this inner product. The factor states can then
be defined unambiguously (except for degeneracy) [34,35] by the plausible
requirement that also the corresponding observer states φˆl are orthogonal,
so that the total state can be written as the single sum,
∑
ik
cikφiψk =
∑
l
cˆlφˆlψˆl . (6)
The transition from the state vector (6) to the ensemble of product states
φˆlψˆl with probabilities |cl|
2 would then be described by the Zwanzig projec-
tion corresponding to the neglect of quantum correlations (entanglement)
between the two subsystems. This hypothesis would answer question (b),
provided the observer system (question (a)) were given.
We also know empirically that the observer system is spatially bounded
(although we cannot give its precise boundaries), and that consciousness
changes with time. If consciousness is in fact defined (and different) at
every moment of time, it should also be related to points in space: the truly
subjective observer system should be related to spacetime points [36]. This
hypothesis may be supported by the “holographic picture” of the brain, or
by Sperry’s split-brain experiments [37]. One would not even be in conflict
with empirical evidence when assuming that every spacetime point carries
consciousness: we can only communicate with some of them, and with other
brains only as a whole, in a nontrivial manner. The identity in time of the
subjective “I” appears as no more than a pragmatic concept, resulting from
strong causal relationships. Only the subjective “I-and-Now” is required as
a fundamental concept.
Before investigating the physical consequences of this hypothesis further,
briefly consider question (c). This and some of the following discussion is not
specifically based on the radical hypothesis of point-like observer systems.
There is no natural time interval between reductions. This difficulty is
hard to overcome. Therefore, it appears fortunate that Everett’s interpreta-
tion, which does not require the reduction, is in practice equivalent to von
Neumann’s. One may then apply Erhard Schmidt’s canonical representa-
tion (6) to the never reduced state vector at every moment of time in order
to postulate [14] that consciousness is “parallel” to one of the states φˆl (or
to all of them separately).7 This new hypothesis avoids the dynamical time
7The branching with respect to different “memory states”, proposed by Everett, would
correspond to an objectivized reduction.
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asymmetry of the reduction. As discussed in a previous paper [38], Everett’s
model (which corresponds to a pre-master equation) is indistinguishable in
practice from von Neumann’s interpretation only if all unobserved (nonex-
isting in von Neumann’s interpretation) components l′ 6= l which might
later interfere with the observed one possess negligible amplitudes cl′ . In
this way, the time-asymmetric dynamical law of reduction is replaced by an
asymmetric assumption about cosmological initial conditions for the total
Everett wave function [36]. The space of unobserved Everett branches has
to be sufficiently empty in order to serve as a perfect sink for initially local
quantum phases. (One may have to use quantum gravity in order to decide
if this emptiness is related to the black night sky or the thermodynamical
arrow of time [39,40].)
Consider a space-like hypersurface of spacetime described by a constant
time coordinate t, and assume that the general state vector |α(t)〉 on this
hypersurface can be written as a wave functional Ψ[φν(x), t],
|α(t)〉 =
∫
Dφν(x)Ψ[φν(x), t] |φν(x)〉 , (7)
where |φν(x)〉 is a state with definite (classical) amplitudes of certain fun-
damental fields φν(x), ν = 1, 2, ..., N . If I1 is some region of space, with I2
being its complement, |φν(x)〉 is approximately (neglecting Casimir-type en-
tanglement of the relativistic vacuum) a direct product, |φν(x)〉I1 |φν(x)〉I2 .
The Schmidt representation with respect to I1 and I2 reads
|α(t)〉 =
∑
l
cˆl|βˆl(t)〉I1 |γˆl(t)〉I2 , (8)
where the factor states can again be written as superpositions of field eigen-
states, for example
|βˆl(t)〉I1 =
∫
(I1)
Dφν(x) Ψˆl[φν(x), t] |φν(x)〉I1 . (9)
The functional integral
∫
(I1)
Dφν(x) . . . now runs over all field amplitudes on
the space region I1 only. Provided I1 carries precisely the ultimate observer
system, one might postulate a (partly reversible) branching of consciousness
into these product states which are distinguished by their index l.
If the region I1 shrinks to a point x0, say, the states |φν(x〉I1 become
|φν(x)〉x0 = |ξν〉 := |φν(x0)〉 , (10)
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that is, states characterized by the values of all fields at the point x0. The
quantum states of such a point can therefore be written as
|β〉x0 =
∫
dξ1 . . . dξN f({ξν}) |{ξν}〉 (11)
The manifoldness of these superpositions appears rich enough to represent
primitive conscious awareness in a psycho-physical parallelism. It seems that
quantum superpositions have never been considered, for example, in neu-
ronal models, since only classical states of definite neuronal excitation are
usually taken into account. These quasi-classical states are also measured
by external neurobiologists. Quantum theory would admit their superposi-
tions, too, thus giving rise to a far greater variety of physical states which
may be experienced by the subjective observer. (Note added: When used for
information processing, such superpositions would now be called “quantum
bits”. As demonstrated by M. Tegmark, they can not be relevant for neu-
ronal and similar processes in the brain – see Phys. Rev E61, 4194 (2000)
or quant-ph/9907009.)
However, the physical carrier of states of primitve consciousness can
neither be expected to include unconscious memories, nor those neuronal
activities which are related to “behavior” (such as speech). Evidently, most
brain activities remain unconscious, but nonetheless contribute to the com-
plexity of “conscious behavior”. For example, the quantum state on the
region I2, which by definition is external to the ultimate observer system,
may be further divided into the rest of the brain, I21, and the external world
in the usual sense, I22. The states |γˆl〉I2 may then again be written as
|γˆl〉I2 =
∑
m
dˆ(l)m |δˆ
(l)
m 〉I21 |ǫˆ
(l)
m 〉I22 . (12)
The type of states |δˆ
(l)
m 〉I21 is thus essentially determined by the unavoid-
able and mostly irreversible interaction of the brain with its environment
I22. The observer system I1 – perhaps assumed to interact only with I21 –
cannot, therefore, observe relative phases between states of different m (see
Section 4 of Ref. 38). If the states on I21 possess memory properties, which
must be “robust” or dynamically stable [14], these properties (in contrast
to the states which carry consciousness) would behave classically: memory
is irreversibly objectivized by means of the unavoidable interaction with its
environment.
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